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Abstract 
Despite the fact that a number of technical 
counter-measures do exist to mitigate the risks 
related to malicious software, in reality users are the 
last line of defense against security incidents. In this 
technology-human interaction, warning messages 
can represent an important tool to help users when 
making a decision. Understanding the effects of 
computer warnings on the progression and duration 
of the malicious software use would bridge the 
existing knowledge gap. Supported by the restrictive 
deterrence model and psychological factors, we 
conducted a non-controlled field experiment in which 
we collected data from no previously recruited 
participants. We found that in the presence of the 
warning message, the progression of the software use 
will be decreased and the duration of both first and 
repeated software uses will be reduced. Finally, we 
offer important findings for further theorizing and 
interesting practitioner insights that could help to 
leverage the interaction between the human and the 
computer technology with an objective to reduce the 
risk.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
The recent security incidents of Target, Home 
Depot and Sony Pictures revealed how destructive 
malware (malicious software) can be to the 
organizational reputation and  financial stability. An 
organization can receive an average of nearly 17,000 
malware alerts in a typical week which represents a 
significant amount of time to respond to these alerts 
impacting organization’s financial resources and IT 
personnel [1]. It is estimated that over 800 million 
people suffered from security incidents (e.g. stealing 
user’s private information) in 2013 [2]. Although, a 
number of technical counter-measures do exist to 
mitigate the risks (e.g. personal anti-virus), in reality 
users represent the last gate in the decision making 
process. In this technology-user interaction, warning 
messages can represent an important tool to help 
them when taking a decision [3]. Warnings represent 
communications designed to prevent users from 
hurting themselves or others [4, 5]. Clearly, warning 
is not the best option as the decision task is on the 
user who has to make a choice. Consequently, users 
who are constantly exposed to security warnings [6] 
often ignore them due to habituation [3, 7, 8]. 
Past research has tried to better understand how 
users interact with warnings and why users ignore 
them [9-13]. Mostly the focus was on examining the 
SSL web browser warning messages and their 
effectiveness [e.g. 14, 15-17] where participants were 
directly recruited. This might present a bias as the 
population was not randomly chosen which could 
lead to users being more likely to click through 
warning dialog messages and less concerned about 
their own privacy [14]. Moreover, little research has 
examined the effects of warnings on the progression 
of the incident event related to the malware use.  
Precisely, most of the studies simply examined if 
user heeds the warning message by measuring user’s 
decision which, mostly, resulted in the binary 
outcome: continue or exit. In this context, it is 
unclear if the warning message has any effect on 
user’s decision.  
Interestingly, while number of studies have used 
deterrence theory to understand how fear of sanctions 
and punishments prevent deviance and crime, only 
few studies have studied the effect of punishment 
threats in reducing the frequency and severity of 
individual offending as suggests restrictive deterrence 
theory [18]. Restrictive deterrence suggests that an 
individual who commits an act of crime at least once 
will be mainly preoccupied with reduction in the 
frequency of the illegal act [18]. More precisely, an 
offender, knowing that the criminal act is committed, 
will seek to decrease the frequency of its offending 
hoping to avoid being caught. Restrictive deterrence 
concept is particularly useful in our context as it 
allows to understand the link between the presence of 
sanction threats (e.g. warning message 
communication) and the restriction of the scope of 
user’s illegal activities (e.g. reducing the frequency of 
the malicious software use). Past studies have failed 
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to clearly establish this link between the warning 
message communication and the frequency, duration 
and progression of an event [19]. 
By addressing this challenge, we aim to bridge 
this gap by examining how warnings can lead to a 
higher effectiveness of sanction threats in presence of 
malware when it comes to the progression, reduction 
in frequency and decrease in duration of the malware 
use.  
Supported by the deterrence theory, and in 
particular the restrictive deterrence model as 
suggested by [18, 20], we aim to investigate three 
research questions: 1) is the warning message leading 
to an immediate incident termination?; 2) is the 
warning message impacting the frequency of 
repeated malware use? and 3) does the warning 
message affect the duration of the hazard? 
 
2. Theoretical foundation  
 
2.1. Restrictive deterrence 
  
Deterrence theory, a prominent theory from the 
Criminology field, suggests that individuals that 
intend to commit a crime or antisocial act can be 
dissuaded by the implementation of sanctions and 
disincentives that are relevant to these acts [21]. 
Theory posits that there is a high chance of being 
caught and punished severely. This general 
deterrence theory has been extended, in the last years, 
by contemporary theoreticians who proposed the 
‘restrictive deterrence’ model which represents the 
process whereby offenders limit the frequency and 
severity of individual offending [18, 20]. For Gibbs 
[18] restrictive deterrence can be defined as “the 
curtailment of a certain type of criminal activity by 
an individual during some period because in whole or 
in part the curtailment is perceived by the individual 
as reducing the risk that someone will be punished as 
a response to the activity” (1975: 33). Surprisingly, 
little research has examined the restrictive deterrence 
aspects and its relationship with deterring user from 
committing risky or bad actions [22]. Paradoxically, 
in the malware context, the offender is the user itself 
who is confronted by the deterrent warning message 
informing the user about possible sanctions that he or 
she may incur if the action is continued.  Therefore, it 
is expected, according to the restrictive deterrence, 
that the user will reduce the frequency of its acts as 
user will be sanctioned at some point in time.  
Interestingly, most of the past studies that 
examined  the restrictive deterrent concept were 
using the qualitative research method [e.g. 20, 23-25] 
investigating a relatively small samples [e.g. 26]. One 
important reason for this lack of the quantitative 
studies could be the access to data as not only that it 
is difficult to build a study that would deal with the 
malware context but also, how to avoid bias by not 
recruiting participants directly. 
 
2.2. Warnings, human interaction and 
restrictive deterrence 
  
    Restrictive deterrence theory suggests that in the 
malware context, users should reduce the frequency 
and duration of their acts. In order to communicate 
the sanction threat, the warning message is 
commonly used as the communication medium 
through which, hazard is explained.   However, 
relying on the individual, to take the ultimate 
decision whether to comply or not, is not the best 
option.  
Indeed, hazard and control hierarchy model [4] 
suggests that warning should only be the third option 
presented to the user. The model argues that the first 
step is to try to eliminate or remove hazard as much 
as possible. The second step should be the avoidance 
of the interaction between the user and the hazard and 
last option should be to present the warning to the 
user who will eventually take the decision. 
To better understand this interaction between the 
humans and the technology, several models and 
framework have been suggested. The human-in-the-
loop (HITL) framework was proposed as a general 
model suggesting a systematic approach to identify 
potential causes for human failure [27]. This model  
is based on the communication-human information 
processing (CHIP) model that describes the 
processing steps that are undertaken by the user when 
confronted  by the warning message [28]. The mental 
model distinguished between  novice and  advanced 
users that make sense of warnings in different ways, 
coming to different conclusions and consequently, 
respond and act differently [29]. Overall, these 
models try to explain the interaction between humans 
and technology that is sequenced and split in 
different stages with the end goal to change the user’s 
behavior. 
User’s ignorance of warnings is explained by the fact 
that users have difficulties  distinguishing the real 
threats from the false ones [17]. However, the 
effectiveness of warnings can be increased by a 
warning text that includes a clear and non-technical 
description of potential negative outcome [16]. Also, 
positioning of the dialog warning message, the 
amount of text, the content length, manipulation of 
the warning content and the amount of technical 
details are some of the cues used to draw the user’s 
attention [15, 30, 31]. One issue with these studies is 
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that they  used a ‘trial and error’ approach in building 
the warning content [16] instead of designing the 
content based on some theoretical foundations.  
When it comes to the restrictive deterrence premises, 
where user behavior is expected to be influenced by 
the warning message communication, we are still 
missing a better understanding of this relationship 
and how the interaction between the user and the 
warning will influence the decision making process. 
Indeed, while majority of past studies focused on 
understanding the effectiveness of warnings in 
preventing and deterring the occurrence of the hazard 
related to the malware propagation and use, little has 
been done to investigate the impact of warnings on 
the progression and duration of the hazard. In 
agreement with [18, 20, 22], we argue that while the 
malware hazard may not be fully stopped due to the 
warning, understanding the occurrence and 
progression of the hazard is of theoretical 
importance. Indeed, we expect to see users behaviors 
impacted by the warning content built around 
psychological cues informing the user about a clear 
description of potential negative outcome that the 
user will incur in case of the non-compliance. 
Hence, based on the restrictive deterrence model and 
supported by the psychological factors, we explore 
this interaction between the human and the 
technology and how the warning message, in relation 
to the progression and duration of hazard, influences 
the human decision. 
 
3. Research hypothesis  
 
Recent reports on malware progression suggest 
that “deceptive downloads” are currently ranked as 
major threat as “deceptive downloads pretend to be 
installers for legitimate software but actually steal or 
destroy the user's sensitive and/or valuable data” 
[32]. The recommendation provided to end users is to 
immediately stop using the potentially malicious 
software and quit it. For example, Apple suggests to 
quit Safari web browser or cancel the installation 
process if malware has been downloaded [33].  
Past studies reported mixed and often 
inconclusive results that were dependent on how the 
warning message was designed. For instance, it was 
found that users react differently when warning is 
displayed by Firefox web browser compared to 
Chrome [14]. In our study, we are looking to 
understand the effectiveness of the displayed warning 
message in determining the progression of the 
hazard, and thereby to explore if the user’s behavior 
will lead to the decreased software use. Precisely, the 
impact of the warning message will be of high 
importance to user’s decision making process only if 
warning message is able to capture users’ attention 
and convey information about the possible hazard 
[17].  
According to Wogalter and Laughery [34], user’s 
attention will be driven by (1) spatial and temporal 
factors such as novelty, size, illumination, and 
contrast, (2) signal words such as “DANGER”, (3) 
signal icons such as an exclamation point, (4) color 
such as red which signals danger in many cultures, 
and (5) pictures such as a pictorial sign displaying 
smoking consequences. One study on web browser 
warnings, such as those that appear when users visit 
suspected phishing websites, showed that altering 
text and color led to a significant increase of user’s 
attention [31]. Clearly, if user is communicated the 
risk that malware will, for instance, destroy its hard 
disk, the chances are much higher that user’s 
attention and consequently, its decision will be 
affected. In this context, we would expect that higher 
impact-warning message (i.e. warning message that, 
for instance, communicates direct risk for user’s data 
will lead to a decreased software use. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that the progression of 
the software use, in presence of the warning message, 
will be positively influenced and decreased by the 
higher impact-warning message 
In line with the restrictive deterrence model [18], 
we argue that during a repeated use of the software, 
users will pay more attention to the warning and will 
be less inclined to ignore it, which should lead to a 
decreased use and consequently, to  abandonment. 
Specifically, it means that users may feel that at a 
certain point in time they will experience negative 
consequences from their act. Hence, we can expect 
that users will try to decrease or avoid their risky by 
reducing their frequency.  
Therefore, we hypothesize that the frequency of 
repeated software use will be decreased in the 
presence of the warning message. 
Moreover, according to Jacobs [20] the warning 
message threat will lead to the restriction of the scope 
of the user’s behavior. This suggests that when user 
is presented with a warning message for the first 
time, and if the message is displayed during the 
repeated software use, duration and progression of 
the hazard should be reduced. When hackers try to 
access an unauthorized system a repeated warning 
may decrease the duration of the security incident 
related to their system use, especially if they believe 
their actions are monitored [22]. This “limiting 
exposure” factor is also highlighted in many counter-
measure practitioner suggestions [e.g. 33] and we 
argue that in the malware context, users will seek to 
limit and shorten the hazard time.   
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Therefore, we hypothesize that the warning 
message will reduce the duration of both first and 
repeated software uses. 
 
4. Research methodology  
 
We designed a non-controlled field experiment 
where users can freely download software to 
manipulate PDF documents from different open 
source web repositories (e.g. sourceforge, github, 
etc.). Software was created by one of the authors 
using Microsoft Visual Basic programming language. 
Software (name PDF Split, Extract and Merge) is a 
fully functional application that allows users to 
manipulate PDF documents (e.g. split, merge, 
extract).   
The reason for choosing to build PDF is because 
PDF software was found to be one of the most used 
rogue IT categories within organizations [35].  
On Figure 1 application screenshots are 
presented. 
  
a) start up screen                       b) main menu 
Figure 1.  Software used for the field experiment 
 
Once the user downloads the application and runs 
it for the first time the startup screen (Figure 1.a) will 
appear where user has to click on start button. After 
clicking on the button, user has to read, accept EULA 
license and provide his or her consent for 
participating in the research study. Once user agreed, 
one of the four warnings will be displayed to the 
user: 1) no-warning message (used as control group); 
2) warning type 1 – low impact; 3) warning type 2 – 
medium impact and 4) warning type 3 – high impact. 
Each of the three warning messages (except the 
control message) expresses different consequences 
for the user if user continues to use the software that 
can be against general security policies , software use 
is illegal and monitored, or it is potentially dangerous 
and malicious . 
We use the “no-warning” message as a control 
group to understand the impact of other warnings. 
The three warning messages design is based on the 
McAfee Security Center layout. McAfee Security 
Center is the graphical user interface for other 
McAffee products such as McAfee Antivirus. We 
kept the original layout but adapted the text for each 
of the three warning messages. The low impact 
warning message does not have any explicit warning 
design elements and is simply advising user not to 
continue using the application. The medium warning 
contains a more explicit warning message informing 
the user about the legal sanctions and the fact that 
software use is monitored and tracked. Finally, the 
high impact warning message communicates a clear 
risk for the user (“This application can be 
dantgerous! It can damage your hard disk and erase 
all your data!”).  
All three textual elements are based on past 
studies which used the same or similar textual 
content in various contexts [9, 17, 22, 30]. For 
instance,  Maimon, Alper, Sobesto and Cukier [22] 
used similar content to inform hackers about risks 
they incur if they penetrate organizational systems. 
Display of the warnings is randomized and 
controlled by the random function within the 
software. 
In each of the cases, the user is presented with 
two options: exit or continue.  
We record four measures: 
 decision that is recorded as “0” if use clicks 
on ‘Exit’ button and “1” if user chooses “Continue” 
 duration is recorded in milliseconds and 
represents the time passed between the click on 
‘Start’ (Figure 1a) and the decision (exit or continue) 
 IP address: user’s internet address (IP 
address) is recorded and is used to have more insights 
on users’ country origin 
 MAC address that represents the unique 
identifier of each PC, assigned to each network 
device (e.g. network card). This measure is used to 
understand the frequency and repeated software use 
which can reveal repeated user’s behavior 
Progression of software use consists of the total 
duration (in milliseconds) representing the time user 
spent deciding whether to continue or exit. 
Progression is operationalized through the duration 
measure. Frequency of repeated software use is 
defined by the subsequent software uses where 
frequency can be 1 if, for example, user used 
software only once or it can be more than 1 
suggesting that user continued to use software despite 
the warning message presence. Frequency is 
operationalized through the UserID measure (unique 
value assigned to each user and combination of MAC 
and IP addresses). Duration of first and repeated 
software uses corresponds to the duration (in 
milliseconds) where user’s initial software use will be 
registered as first (UserID is stored in the database) 
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and repeated software use are all subsequent 
registered software uses (e.g. second use will have a 
certain duration time). 
 
4.1. Participants 
  
As the software was placed on the internet, any 
user was able to download, install and use the 
software freely. This means that we did not recruit 
any participants for the study, which increases the 
study’s validity. By doing so, we were able to create 
and simulate a genuine environment. 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval was 
given to collect data and human-subject protocols 
were followed. In addition, every participant had to 
provide his or her consent for being part of a research 
study. Once the application was started, a dialog box 
was opened informing the user about study’s 
objectives (and informing them that no identifiable 
information would be collected) and asking them to 
confirm their participation. If users’ would chose not 
to participate then we would not measure any of their 
activities (this was set programmatically). Hence, 
users were fully aware of the experiment. 
Also, all participants had to accept end user 
license agreement (EULA) which, among other 
clauses, stipulated that “By downloading this 
software, you consent to send usage information to 
improve this product and future research”. 
 
4.2. Results 
  
While we did not have any demographics 
collected, as we did not actively recruit participants, 
the only information that was available is the user’s 
country. In total, 790 events were recorded (in 35 
cases users chosen not to participate in the study – for 
them we did not collect any information but just 
counted their refusal to participate). We had users 
from 75 different countries that downloaded the 
software at least once. In table 1 the breakdown of 
the top 20 users’ country downloads is presented. 
 
Country 
% of 
downl
oads Country 
% of 
downloa
ds 
United 
States 
29% 
Indonesia 
2% 
Germany 13% Mexico 2% 
India 
13% United 
Kingdom 
2% 
Italy 7% Poland 2% 
Spain 4% Sweden 2% 
France 3% Brazil 2% 
Netherlands 3% China 2% 
Turkey 3% Russia 2% 
Canada 2% Australia 1% 
Romania 2% Singapore 1% 
Table 1. Top 20 users’ country downloads 
In Table 2 a detailed overview of warnings 
displayed and the corresponding user actions can be 
found. Exit action was chosen in 36% of all cases, 
while 64% of users decided to continue with the 
software use. When it comes to the warning types, as 
expected, for the ‘No warning’ message only few 
users (10%) stopped using the application while the 
large majority (90%) continued. Other warning types 
(low and medium impact warning message) had 
similar results where majority of users continued 
their behavior and were not influenced by the risk 
suggested by the warning. However, the ‘high 
warning’ message seemed to have a different effect 
where 63% of users found the message to be rather 
persuasive and thus, decided to exit the software use 
compared to the 37% of users who continued. 
 
Overview of all warnings types 
Warning 
type 
Exit action 
(decision=0) 
Continue 
action 
(decision=1) 
Total 
Low 
Warning 
78 (34%) 151 (66%) 
229 
Medium 
Warning 
95 (44%) 121 (56%) 
216 
High 
Warning 
90 (63%) 53 (37%) 
143 
No 
Warning 
19 (10%) 179 (90%) 
198 
Warning vs Control 
Warning 266 (45%) 326 (55%) 592 
Control 19 (10%) 179 (90%) 198 
Grand 
Total 
284 (36%) 506 (64%) 790 
Table 2. Overview of warnings display and users’ 
actions 
We conclude that hypothesis 1 is supported as 
progression of the software use, in presence of the 
warning message, will be positively influenced and 
decreased by the higher impact-warning message. 
Next, we wanted to understand if frequency of 
repeated software use will be decreased in the 
presence of the warning message. We used the 
information from the entire set of incidents (N=790) 
and estimated whether the mean number of repeated 
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incidents is significantly different between the 
warning and the control group. Hence, we test for a 
significant difference between the proportions of 
immediate cessation on warning (when user is 
presented with one of the three warnings) event and 
no-warning (control group). We performed a t-test to 
compare the two proportions using decision as a 
dependent variable. The results from this test 
revealed an insignificant difference between these 
two groups (Z= -6.6; p > .05). 
We conclude that hypothesis 2 is not supported as 
the frequency of repeated software use is not 
decreased in the presence of the warning message. 
Further, to understand how warning message 
impact the duration and the progression of the hazard, 
we analyze the survival time of the software use. As 
we cannot simply compare the average hazard 
durations, due to the right skewed distribution of the 
survival time, we use event history analysis 
technique.  One such survival technique is the 
Kaplan-Meier Survival estimator [36] which enables 
dealing with differing survival times (times-to-event), 
especially when not all the subjects continue in the 
study [37].  
The survival rate is expressed as the survivor 
function (S): where t is a time period known as the 
survival time, time to failure or time to event (e.g. 
exit or continue action). 
The results of the Kaplan-Meier estimate are 
presented on Figure 2. We can see that warning 
messages have high effect on the survival times 
between the control warning message (no warning 
message) and all other warning messages. It means 
that the proportion of the software use that survived 
is shorter on the treatment (warning) than on the 
control (no-warning). 
By estimating the Cox proportional-hazard 
regression, we tested the significance of the effects of 
warning on the hazard duration. The Cox model 
allows  investigation of the relationship  between the 
survival of the event and independent measures [38].   
The results, calculated using mplus software, are 
presented in Table 3. 
Results confirm that the warning banner has a 
positive association with the hazard of the first 
observed event termination. 
Hence, the hazard ratio estimate of the warning 
measure shows that the warning message is 
significantly (more than 1.6 times) increasing the rate 
of first observed event leading to much shorter event 
duration. 
Consequently, hypothesis 3 is supported as hazard 
ration increases in presence of the warning message, 
indicating that the warning message will reduce the 
duration of both first and repeated software uses. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Kaplan-Meier function (in milliseconds) 
 
 
  Coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
Hazard  
ratio 
Log 
Likelihood 
First 
observed 
events 
(N=248) 
0.75* 1.65 
-120.23 
All 
observed 
events 
(N=790) 
0.181* 0.774 
-1541.356 
∗p < .05 (two-tailed); 
Table 3. Cox Proportional hazards survival 
regression results 
 
5. Discussion 
 
Our paper makes several contributions. First, we 
studied the interaction between the human and the 
technology in the context of malware use. 
Specifically, how users react in the presence of 
sanctions highlighted by the warning message. 
Indeed, computer users in their communication and 
interaction process with the technology will be more 
inclined to follow the procedure if there is a security 
concern behind [39], but their decision making 
process may be burdened by the overwhelming 
After 3 seconds 
control 
treatment 
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amount of warnings remains [16]. This is very true in 
many contexts where users are frequently seeing too 
many warnings. For example, users clicked through 
Google Chrome’s SSL warning 70.2% of the time but 
only 33.0% of Mozilla Firefox’s SSL warnings [14]. 
Our study examined three hypotheses.  
First, we hypothesized that the progression of the 
software use, in presence of the warning message, 
will be positively influenced and decreased by the 
higher impact-warning message. Unlike the past 
studies which often had mixed and inconclusive 
results, we clearly found support for this hypothesis 
where the progression of the software use is impacted 
by the warning message. Furthermore, as a higher 
degree of impact is communicated to the user, lower 
click-through is observed. This finding bridges the 
gap of the past studies, which mostly focused on one 
single warning type and in a particular environment 
(e.g. web browser). Interestingly, during the first 
three seconds, the proportion of survival events is 
very similar for both warning and no-warning 
context. This could be explained by the fact that users 
are simply habituated to see warnings and simply 
ignore them [3, 8] or it can be that, as suggested by 
the mental model approach [40], users can be more 
advanced in terms of their technological skills and 
thus, can better assess the risks than the novices 
users.  
Other possible explanations are that users did not 
read the computer warning [7], did not understand the 
warning [41] or simply do not heed them  [42]. In 
this content, our finding is in line with these 
explanations. However, we clearly show that the 
click through (CTR) decreases with the impact level 
of the warning message. From the low impact 
warning (66% CTR), medium (56% CTR) to high 
impact (37% CTR), there is a clear impact on the 
progression and duration of the software use. It 
would be very interesting to see what would happen 
if a highly effective (warning message 
communicating high risk) warning message would be 
communicated to users. Would the click through 
decrease to a very low and acceptable level so we 
could confirm that warning message leads to an 
immediate cessation of the software use?  
Second, we hypothesized that the frequency of 
repeated software use will be decreased in the 
presence of the warning message. Contrary to the 
suggestion of the restrictive deterrence model [18], 
we did not find any support that the frequency of 
repeated uses is reduced in presence of the warning 
message. More precisely, average number of times 
user is using software is not different in presence of 
the warning or the control message. Hence, the 
frequency of repeated uses is not affected and user 
decision-making process remains consistent whether 
in presence of the warning or non-warning (i.e. 
control) message.  
We explain this by the fact that if the user is at 
first presented with the high impact warning message 
and user ignores it, all the successive uses will also 
not be deterred as if user was not deterred by the high 
impact warning, why would he or she care about the 
lower impact warning content? However, if it was the 
opposite scenario where user saw the low warning 
message that was followed by medium or high 
impact warning message, it could be that user’s 
frequency of repeated uses would be reduced. This is 
something that was found to be effective in the 
tobacco industry where users instead of being 
presented with the standard packaging message (e.g. 
“Smoking can cause a slow and painful death”), 
would be presented with a much higher impact 
warning message such as pictorial health warnings 
that elicits strong emotional reactions which are 
significantly more effective [43].  
It is evident that the risk communication is a very 
important step when designing the warning content. 
While in our study the warning message were 
randomly displayed to the user, it would be very 
interesting to see the impact of the warning message 
on the frequency of repeated uses by assigning a 
particular impact level warning (e.g. medium) to each 
participant, which would then be increased to reach a 
high level impact (e.g. the pictorial health-warning 
message). 
Third, we hypothesized that the warning message 
will reduce the duration of both first and repeated 
software uses. Our study has an important finding 
where the warning message reduces the duration of 
both first and repeated software uses. This finding 
offers important empirical contribution supporting 
the restrictive deterrence model [18, 20]. The 
duration reduction can be further explained by the 
fact that users want to reduce their exposure for 
longer periods as they believe that some malicious 
actions could be committed by the software against 
them. In that context, users will simply try to avoid 
the punishment [44] and react to the sanction threats 
originating from the environment [24]. 
Overall, the results of our study suggest that the 
warning message affects the human behavior. 
Knowing that the human factor is usually the weakest 
link in the security chain [45] and considered to be 
the last line of defense against security risks [3], we 
argue that the importance of the warning message in 
that context becomes even higher.  
However, in order to fully understand the warning 
message effectiveness other factors need to be taken 
into consideration. One of them relates to the fact that 
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the language in existing warnings is not as clear as it 
could be [16]. This is an interesting insight, as it 
could be that the warning communication is simply 
not what user expects to read. For example, even a 
simple word such as ‘malware’ may not be 
understandable by general user population.  
Moreover, another aspect that could further 
explain our results relates to the organizational trust. 
Users will generally have more trust in software that 
was issued by organizations that have certain 
reputation. Clearly, the level of compliance will 
depend on the level of institutional trust [46]. All 
these factors, to certain extent, can influence the 
effectiveness of the sanction threat communicated by 
the warning message.  
 
5.1. Theoretical contribution 
  
Our study attempted to uncover the facets of the 
human-computer technology realm, and in particular 
the interaction between the human-warning message-
computer system, which is particularly interesting as 
it is not only bringing more clarity to this 
relationship, but it also suggests future avenues to 
study the antecedents of human behavior. We 
empirically investigated the effects of a sanction 
threat on the occurrence, progression and duration of 
the software use. By doing so, not only did we 
support the restrictive deterrence model [18] but also 
brought  important theoretical insights. Indeed, the 
deterrence effect is particularly visible and 
pronounced in the time continuum (specifically, after 
three seconds) which suggests that a restrictive 
deterrence is quite effective but is also reaching its 
limits, as it does not explain why the frequency of 
repeated uses is not reduced. 
In addition, we advanced the fact the interaction 
between the human and the computer system, which 
is mediated by the computer warning, is a very 
complex model that requires further theorizing. Our 
study, offers important insights toward this direction. 
Thanks to the unique setting we used in this study 
and the fact that we did not actively recruit any 
participants, enabled us to investigate more accurate 
relationships in the human-computer system 
interaction. 
 
5.2. Practitioner contribution 
  
In this study we used software application which 
was displaying computer warnings to users aiming at 
understanding their behaviors in the decision making 
process. For the end user this ‘displaying’ process 
was transparent as it could not be easily identified if 
the warning message was coming from the software 
itself or from the operating system.  
There are several ways our study could contribute 
to the existing challenges related to the information 
systems security. When it comes to installing new 
software, plugging-in hardware (e.g. external hard 
disk, USB key, etc.), or doing any action that can put 
in risk user’s data or privacy integrity, we believe 
that the operating system (or any other automated 
computer technology related mechanism) should 
better interact with the user by displaying a more 
efficient warning message. And this does not relate 
only to the malware context, which we explore in this 
study, but it can be applied to all contexts where risks 
may be present. For example, we suggest that 
computer technology should start the interaction with 
the user when USB key is inserted into the computer 
and warn the user about the underlying risks.  
 
5.3. Limitations and future research 
  
Our study has several limitations. Due to the 
nature of the research design, as we did not recruit 
any of the participants, we also could not collect any 
demographics from the participants nor to follow up 
with additional surveys to better understand who the 
users are and get better understanding of their 
technical skills, which could have some influence on 
the results interpretation. Another limitation is that 
among the users that constantly ignored the warnings, 
we could not check if they knew that the warning was 
coming from the software and not from the operating 
system, which was our intention.   
For future research, it would be interesting to 
extend the participant sample to business users 
(organizations) or students as these two populations 
could bring interesting new insights about the 
deterrent effects of warning messages.  
Also, in our study we used a restrictive deterrence 
model as the theoretical foundation and built the 
warning message content using some of the 
psychological cues (e.g. risk consequences), but 
future studies could extend on this by using theories 
used from other disciplines which could be applied in 
the information systems context (e.g. health belief 
model or accountability theory). 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Our study represents one of the first attempts at 
addressing an important issue: what are the effects of 
warnings on user’s behavior in preventing malware 
use? The results suggest that the warning message 
affects the human behavior. Supported by the 
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restrictive deterrent concept and using psychological 
factors to build the warning messages, we found that 
in the presence of the warning message, the 
progression of the software use will be decreased and 
the duration of both first and repeated software uses 
will be reduced.. 
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